Cities on the Brink: Can South Africa Avoid Becoming the Next Luanda or Maputo?

Urban Decay & Governance Collapse in South African Cities

Johannesburg: The Collapse of an Economic Hub

Johannesburg, South Africa’s largest metropolis and economic engine, exemplifies the country’s urban collapse. The city of ~5.5 million (contributing 16% of national GDP) is “falling apart” as its road, electricity, and water infrastructure show “clear signs of collapse”. Years of financial mismanagement, maladministration, and “unchecked corruption” have drained public resources and left the municipality unable to maintain basic infrastructure. The Auditor-General in early 2025 flagged over R1 billion in fruitless and wasteful expenditures in Johannesburg. The result is evident on the ground:

• Roads and Traffic: The city’s roads are riddled with potholes and its bridges are literally crumbling. Johannesburg has 902 bridges. A shocking 78% of bridges are rated “poor or very poor,” with 20 bridges on the verge of closure. Funding shortfalls (an estimated R16 billion is needed for road network restoration) have led to severe neglect. Potholes have become ubiquitous, sometimes rendering roads nearly impassable. Desperate residents resort to makeshift patching of potholes in their neighborhoods. Adding to the woes, vandalism and theft plague transportation infrastructure – criminal syndicates steal copper cables, batteries, and even solar panels from traffic lights, causing persistent signal outages and dangerous intersections. Johannesburg Road Agency officials note that beyond funding, a solution requires stricter law enforcement against vandalism, and partnerships to assist with maintenance.
                                          
• Electricity Supply: Johannesburg’s electrical grid is on the brink of failure. In addition to nationwide load-shedding (rolling blackouts imposed by Eskom), the city’s own distribution network (run by City Power) suffers constant breakdowns due to aging equipment, overload, and rampant theft. As of January 2025, City Power was logging over 800 local outages every two weeks – on top of load-shedding – highlighting the severity of the crisis. Decades of under-investment have created a maintenan (Cape Town embraces New Urbanism in updated planning guidelines | The Cape Independent) (Cape Town embraces New Urbanism in updated planning guidelines | The Cape Independent)ion for the power grid. Transformers and substations frequently explode or catch fire (especially when power returns after blackouts, causing surges). Opportunistic thieves exploit power cuts to steal transformers, high-voltage cables, and other components – some neighborhoods have endured multi-week blackouts as a result. Illegal connections in informal settlements further strain the grid and reduce supply for paying customers. City Power admits it cannot keep up: repeated equipment thefts often undo repairs as fast as they are made. With Johannesburg’s economy heavily reliant on electricity, businesses have been forced to invest in costly generators or solar installations to survive frequent outages. The utility’s finances are dire as well – City Power owes Eskom roughly R6.3 billion in unpaid electricity bills. Without a massive overhaul of the electrical network – upgrading hardware, securing facilities against theft, and adding new capacity – experts warn the city’s power supply could collapse entirely, with devastating economic consequences. Electrical infrastructure in crisis: a Johannesburg substation on fire. Aging, overloaded equipment often fails catastrophically, exacerbating rolling blackouts. Persistent theft of cables and components adds to extended outages.
                           
• Johannesburg’s water infrastructure is likewise nearing collapse. Over 60% of the city’s water pipes have exceeded their intended design lifespan, resulting in frequent bursts and leaks. The CEO of Johannesburg Water has identified a R27 billion backlog for replacing and upgrading deteriorating water and sewage infrastructure. Residents in many areas experience low pressure or completely dry taps for days at a time. In 2023–2024, large sections of the city repeatedly went without water – for example, a lightning strike on a pump station in March left parts of Johannesburg dry for 11 days – and utility Rand Water warned that the entire system was at risk of collapse as demand far outstripped supply. Non-revenue water losses are huge: leaks, illegal connections, and vandalism mean a significant share of treated water never reaches consumers. Johannesburg Water reports thieves have stolen thousands of water meters (1,100 in one recent year), manhole covers (3,450) and even valves and fire hydrants (3,000) – crippling the network and costing the city millions. Additionally, over 25,000 sewer blockages had to be cleared in a year, at a cost of R38.6 million, due to trash and grease buildup in aging sewers. Load-shedding compounds the water crisis: when power is off, water pumping stations shut down, reservoirs can’t refill, and entire suburbs are left waterless. After prolonged power cuts, some reservoirs never recover to normal levels. An expert hydrologi (South Africa’s most important city collapsing in front of everyone’s eyes – BusinessTech) Johannesburg’s water woes result from “failing infrastructure and poor management and planning”, and called for more skilled personnel, better maintenance, and stricter action against water theft to avert a total collapse.
                                
• Governance and Finances: Underpinning Johannesburg’s infrastructure failures is a story of governance collapse. The city has been politically unstable (South Africa’s infrastructure on the verge of collapse – Daily Investor)t changes of mayoral administrations in recent years, and a decline in financial discipline. The current mayor acknowledged that expenditures exceed income, as revenue collection has slipped to only ~86% of billed amounts. This has driven a growing budget deficit, leaving little funding for capital maintenance. Corruption has been particularly damaging – for instance, a “syndicate” embedded in the city (and provincial departments) has siphoned resources, according to academic assessments. In practice, this means money intended for fixing roads or maintaining substations has often been misappropriated or wasted. The consequence is a vicious cycle: poor service delivery leads some residents to stop paying rates and service fees, which further squeezes the city’s finances and its ability to fix the very services people are unhappy about. Johannesburg’s decline is now so sever (Media Statement: The South African Human Rights Commission on developments in Hammanskraal regarding the safety of water supplied) (South Africa: Commission Warns of Water Supply ‘Disaster’ in KZN Unless Municipalities Tackle Maintenance and Corruption – allAfrica.com) a potential “full-scale collapse” unless corruption and mismanagement are decisively addressed alongside infrastructure renewal.

Durban/eThekwini: From World-Class City to Dysfunction

Durban (the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality) – historically a tourism (South Africa’s most important city collapsing in front of everyone’s eyes – BusinessTech) destination – is likewise beset by decay stemming from crime, corruption, and infrastructure failures. Parts of the inner city have deteriorated into slums. (South Africa’s most important city collapsing in front of everyone’s eyes – BusinessTech) (South Africa: Commission Warns of Water Supply ‘Disaster’ in KZN Unless Municipalities Tackle Maintenance and Corruption – allAfrica.com) A 2022 investigative report described “Durban decay – how crime and corruption are turning a world-class city into a crumbling nightmare”, noting that even newly imposed water rationing in some areas was just the tip of the iceberg. Key symptoms of Durban’s urban dysfunction include:

• Urban Blight and Crime: Durban’s central business district and surrounding zones are marred by “crime and grime”, with many dilapidated ‘problem buildings’ that have been abandoned or hijacked by squatters. These neglected buildings often lack electricity or water, becoming centers of criminal activity and undermining surrounding property values. A post-2023 survey in the wake of the tragic Johannesburg inner-city fire (August 2023) highlighted similar fears in Durban – that the proliferation of unsafe, overcrowded buildings could lead to a disaster. In Durban’s historic Warwick Junction area, for example, a notorious complex nicknamed “Marikana” (three adjacent derelict buildings) symbolizes the city’s descent into disorder. Urban planners in Durban have called the consistent decay of the built environment “an indictment of the municipality”, noting that if nothing is done, *“the whole city will resemble these [derelict] buildings in the near future”. The collapse of enforcement on building safety and urban management is tied to municipal governance failures; Durban’s city administration has struggled to address a growing *“urban syndicate”* problem where organized criminal groups extort city construction projects (the so-called “construction mafia”) and hijack properties with impunity. Lawlessness in the urban core has driven businesses away and increased residents’ fear, accelerating economic decline.
                               
• Service Delivery and Infrastructure: Durban’s basic services have become increasingly unreliable. Water outages have plagued various parts of eThekwini. In late 2022, after catastrophic floods damaged treatment (Cape Town embraces New Urbanism in updated planning guidelines | The Cape Independent) plants it applied rotating water rationing in many neighborhoods – a stark indicator of infrastructure stress. Even by 2023, the South African Human Rights Commission warned that KwaZulu-Natal (the province including Durban) faces a looming water supply “disaster” unless maintenance and corruption issues are tackled urgently. The Commission’s detailed report painted a picture of “crumbling state of water supply” due to decades of neglect – pipes and pumps left to deteriorate – and a failure to budget for maintenance. Ethekwini’s own Water and Sanitation unit has been criticized for slow repairs and high rates of leaks. In early 2023, nearly 40% of Durban’s treated water was being lost to leaks, theft, and billing errors, per city officials – a massive waste that has forced the imposition of water restrictions. Electricity in Durban is somewhat buffered by the city’s partial self-reliant grid, but power cuts and substation failures have also become more common in township areas and the outskirts. Cable theft and vandalism are rising in eThekwini too, causing prolonged outages in communities. For example, in 2023, parts of Durban’s Umlazi and Chatsworth areas experienced multi-day blackouts due to stolen cables and transformers, prompting protests. Durban’s roads, meanwhile, suffer from potholes and poor maintenance like other cities, compounded by the impact of heavy trucks serving the port. The April 2022 floods inflicted an estimated R17 billion in infrastructure damage in eThekwini (washing away roads, bridges, and water mains). Subsequent recovery has been slow – many flood-damaged bridges and pipes were still unrepaired a year later amid allegations that emergency funds were mismanaged or stolen. This illustrates how corruption has tangible effects: for instance, investigations revealed that portions of relief funds were siphoned by corrupt officials, delaying the rebuilding of vital infrastructure.
                                           
• Governance and Corruption: Durban’s municipal government has been rocked by high-profile corruption scandals. In March 2020, eThekwini’s city manager was arrested on charges of fraud and corruption relating to city contracts. This was part of a broader case involving the ex-m (South Africa’s most important city collapsing in front of everyone’s eyes – BusinessTech) pointing to systemic graft at the top. Such scandals have destabilized administration – multiple scandals (South Africa’s most important city collapsing in front of everyone’s eyes – BusinessTech) interrupting service delivery continuity. Moreover, Durban has faced what locals dub as gangs that extort contractors or violently disrupt city projects unless (South Africa: Commission Warns of Water Supply ‘Disaster’ in KZN Unless Municipalities Tackle Maintenance and Corruption – allAfrica.com)  led to massive delays in Durban’s R22 billion (Media Statement: The South African Human Rights Commission on developments in Hammanskraal regarding the safety of water supplied) (Media Statement: The South African Human Rights Commission on developments in Hammanskraal regarding the safety of water supplied)) project (“Go!Durban”). The project, launched in the mid-2010s to improve public transport (South Africa: Cash-Strapped Tshwane Targets Service Delivery Backlog After Municipal Strike Ends – allAfrica.com) lt** as certain business forums (some essentially crime groups) demanded i (Ekurhuleni businesses buckle under cable theft scourge) (Ekurhuleni businesses buckle under cable theft scourge)etimes under threat of violence. Coupled with mismanagement and disput (Four dead in South Africa protests over high power costs | Protests News | Al Jazeera)rators, this left the BRT largely unfinished as of 2024, despite billions spent. The absence of st (Cape Town embraces New Urbanism in updated planning guidelines | The Cape Independent)these disruptions to fester. An internal report on eThekwini’s governa () ()t, disregard and in some instances, contempt, for people’s suffering and their attempt (South Africa: Durban’s Hijacked and ‘Problem Buildings’ in Spotlight As Communities Fear Repeat of Joburg Inferno – allAfrica.com) unicipality”* – a damning assessment that r (Luanda’s vertical slums)mplaints about water, electricity, and other (On the impact of urban planning in contexts with limited enforcement …) (Maputo challenges :: mozambiqueexpert)unheard. On a positive note, Durban hosted the 2014 World Cities Summit and the 2019 World Economic Forum Africa, which spurred some improvements (such as a cleanup of parts of the beachfront and CBD); however, these were largely cosmetic and not sustained. Community activists and business forums in Durban are now pressing for a turnaround plan to prevent eThekwini from sliding further into dysfunction. They point enviously to Cape Town’s better-run systems and urge adopting similar approaches (e.g. more transparent procurement and empowered technical departments).

Tshwane (Pretoria): Financial Distress and Service Delivery Failures

The City of Tshwane, which includes Pretoria (South Africa’s administrative capital), has in recent years faced a cascade of crises that epitomize urban mismanagement. Tshwane’s service delivery has teetered on collapse amid strikes, infrastructure failures, and a near bankruptcy of the city government. Key aspects of Tshwane’s situation include:

• Municipal Financial Crisis: Tshwane has been cash-strapped and in political turmoil. In mid-2023, the city could not afford a 5.4% wage increase agreed nationally for municipal workers, citing an untenable budget gap – Tshwane was struggling to pay creditors like Eskom (for bulk power) and Rand Water (for bulk water) on time. In July 2023 this led to a municipal workers’ strike that lasted four months. Thousands of workers downed tools from July through November, grinding many services to a halt. The strike turned violent: city trucks and buses were torched (255 vehicles destroyed) and some infrastructure sabotaged. Crucially, revenue collection plummeted during this period (as meters weren’t read and bills not delivered), worsening Tshwane’s finances. By late 2023, Tshwane’s executive mayor described the city as “financially distressed” and launched a recovery plan to catch up on service backlogs. The instability in governance (the city has seen several mayors in a short span due to coalition politics, and was even briefly placed under administration in 2020) has meant that long-term planning was neglected in favor of firefighting immediate fiscal issues.
                                         
• Electricity and Power Infrastructure: Tshwane’s electrical infrastructure is aging and under-maintained, leading to frequent localized outages on top of Eskom’s load-shedding. Notably, in April 2023, a major incident occurred when several high-voltage transmission pylons collapsed onto the N4 highway, plunging large parts of Pretoria into darkness for days. An investigation found the collapse was due to the theft of structural steel supports by scrap-metal thieves, illustrating how criminal activity can precipitate infrastructure disaster. The city was instructed to urgently reconnect those lines, but progress was slow. In February 2025, an explosion at the Njala 132kV infeed substation knocked out power to wide areas (such as Soshanguve, a large township). Residents, frustrated by days of darkness, resorted to street protests with burning tires. The root cause was insufficient investment in substation upgrades – the budget had not allocated the needed R25 million to repair and upgrade Njala, despite warnings. Political infighting was partly to blame: one report noted the mayor at the time focused on unrelated portfolios while “notable in her avoidance” of urgent electricity issues. Meanwhile, cable theft has hit Pretoria’s neighborhoods hard. In the capital’s Moot area, thieves have begun pulling down overhead supply lines with vehicles, leaving whole suburbs like Rietfontein and Wonderboom South without electricity repeatedly. The city’s limited technical crews (only two crane trucks for a large region) struggle to restore power after such vandalism. Many residents cannot afford generators or solar, so outages mean spoiled food and daily hardship. These problems are exacerbated by Tshwane’s inability to fund proactive maintenance – transformer replacements and network refurbishments are behind schedule, and substations operate beyond intended capacity. In essence, Tshwane’s power supply has become highly unreliable, prompting calls for a state of emergency on electricity.
                                                            
• Water and Sanitation: Perhaps the most tragic outcome of Tshwane’s service collapse was the Hammanskraal cholera outbreak in 2023. Hammanskraal, a community north of Pretoria, had suffered unsafe drinking water for over a decade due to the failure of the Rooiwal wastewater treatment plant (which polluted the source water). The city’s neglect of wastewater infrastructure – insufficient budgets, poor maintenance, and endless delays in upgrades – led to untreated sewage contaminating the Apies River and Leeukraal Dam, which feed Hammanskraal’s supply. In May 2023, this came to a head: cholera bacteria infected the water, causing 99 confirmed cases and 23 deaths in Hammanskraal. The South African Human Rights Commission found that “failure to manage and maintain existing Waste Water Treatment Works” over many years was the primary reason for this disaster. The Commission’s inquiry cited “insufficient budget allocation, continuous change in municipal managers, poor planning, poor management, and lack of skilled human resources” as factors in Rooiwal’s collapse. In response, emergency measures were taken: the national government and Magalies Water intervened with a R750 million project to build a temporary treatment plant and supply Hammanskraal with safe water. By early 2025, the first phase of this project was complete, finally delivering clean water to parts of Hammanskraal for the first time in ~20 years. However, many areas of Tshwane still suffer water interruptions. In 2023, large sections of Pretoria East faced dry taps as reservoir levels fell; the city’s aging pipelines leak an estimated 30–40% of water. Like Johannesburg, Tshwane was warned by Rand Water in late 2023 that its water usage (at times 63% above allocation) was unsustainable. This led to water rationing in high-consumption suburbs. The sanitation situation is equally concerning: budget constraints have delayed upgrades to other treatment works, and sewage spills into rivers (like the Jukskei and Roodeplaat Dam) have been frequent, violating environmental regulations. The cholera outbreak served as a deadly alarm bell on the consequences of neglect.
                                                                    
• Roads and Other Services: Tshwane’s road network and local services have deteriorated with limited maintenance during the financial crunch. Potholes are a top complaint; in 2022 the city estimated a backlog of over 240,000 potholes needing patching across its regions. During the worker strike in 2023, no potholes were fixed, trash went uncollected, streetlights stayed broken – accelerating urban decay. Citizens noted that some Pretoria streets started to resemble those in war-torn cities, with refuse piling up and broken traffic lights creating chaos. Additionally, public transport in Tshwane (municipal buses and the A Re Yeng BRT system) was largely halted during the strike and has struggled financially, leaving commuters stranded. The cumulative effect in Tshwane has been that residents in both wealthy suburbs and poor townships have lost faith in the city’s ability to provide basics. By late 2023, civic organizations were taking the city to court to force it to perform its duties, and the national Treasury had threatened to withhold funds if Tshwane did not get its budget in order.

Ekurhuleni: Infrastructure Strain in an Industrial Center

Ekurhuleni, the metro on Johannesburg’s East Rand (including towns like Germiston, Boksburg, Kempton Park, and Tembisa), is Gauteng’s industrial heartland. It hosts factories, the O.R. Tambo International Airport, and millions of residents. In recent years Ekurhuleni too has shown signs of advanced infrastructure fatigue and governance issues:

• Electricity and Cable Theft: Ekurhuleni’s foremost challenge has been maintaining electricity supply in the face of relentless cable theft and aging infrastructure. The theft of electrical cables is cited as the “leading cause for prolonged power outages in Ekurhuleni”, even beyond the impact of Eskom load-shedding. In 2022, the situation became so bad that the city overspent its annual maintenance budget within 6 months – spending R356 million by September on emergency repairs (versus a budgeted R230 million for the year). Repair crews are constantly replacing stolen cables and transformers. Industrial areas like Springs and Germiston have suffered repeated unplanned outages, forcing factories to halt production. A local business chamber leader observed that “Germiston is becoming a ghost town and it is because of the power outages”, noting extended cuts wreak havoc on industrial machinery and output. For instance, when power goes off suddenly, big machines can take 20 hours to restart properly, causing huge productivity loss. Companies have had to invest heavily in backup generators to cope. The city’s new mayor in 2023 acknowledged that townships like Tembisa are facing a lot of issues with electricity and billing, and saw frequent protests as a result. Indeed, in Tembisa, anger over high electricity tariffs and poor supply boiled over in August 2022 – residents barricaded roads and burned the municipal office, and clashes led to four people being killed. That unrest was triggered by massive bills and outages, reflecting community frustration. Technically, Ekurhuleni’s electrical department reported that ongoing Eskom load-shedding has been particularly damaging: the on-off power cycles strain older equipment, causing many additional breakdowns and tripping outages. A council oversight report stressed that “continuous load-shedding on older equipment leads to breakdown of equipment and forced unplanned interruptions”. In other words, even when Eskom restores power, Ekurhuleni’s worn infrastructure often fails, extending blackouts. By early 2023, breakdowns affected all nine energy depots of the metro, across all regions. The city spokesperson confirmed that every area – from affluent suburbs to informal settlements – was hit by equipment failures and theft, with over 50 intake substations in need of urgent maintenance. Ekurhuleni has responded by ramping up security efforts (partnering with police to patrol hotspots) and implementing load reduction in high-theft areas like parts of Tembisa (cutting power during off-peak times to reduce cable theft opportunities). However, these are stop-gap measures. Without a significant upgrade to the electrical grid (replacing decades-old cables, increasing transformer capacity, and securing substations with alarms or surveillance), the metro will continue to suffer economically-driven vandalism and unstable supply.
                                                        
• Water and Services: Ekurhuleni relies on Rand Water for bulk water, and in late 2023 Gauteng’s water crisis hit this metro hard. Areas like Bedfordview endured up to 9 days with dry taps in March 2023 due to Rand Water’s supply issues and local reservoir problems. The municipality angered residents by providing slow and inadequate relief via water tankers. Ekurhuleni accused Rand Water of under-supplying, while Rand Water pointed to municipalities exceeding allocations (Ekurhuleni was using 80% more water than permitted by 2023). This standoff highlighted poor coordination and the lack of local backup systems. Many neighborhoods also experience frequent pipe bursts – the East Rand is crisscrossed by old asbestos cement water pipes that are failing. At one point in 2022, Ekurhuleni reported over 3,000 unattended water leaks due to insufficient repair teams. The sanitation infrastructure, especially wastewater treatment, is similarly stretched; spills into rivers like the Vaal have been recorded, and some sewage treatment plants operate over capacity. Beyond utilities, basic urban management in Ekurhuleni has deteriorated. Garbage collection strikes have left trash piling up in CBDs like Germiston. Potholes and broken streetlights are common complaints across the metro’s towns. Crucially, governance instability has hampered progress: Ekurhuleni’s council, like Johannesburg and Tshwane, saw shifting coalitions after the 2021 local elections. A mayor was removed in late 2022, then another installed, delaying budget approvals and disrupting projects. Amid this, residents sometimes take matters into their own hands – for example, community groups in Boksburg organized “fill-a-pothole” campaigns, and informal settlement dwellers in Vosloorus illegally reconnected electricity after long outages. These acts underscore a breakdown in trust between the city and citizens.
                                                 
• Comparative Resilience: Despite these issues, Ekurhuleni has had some relative strengths. Its finances historically were better managed than Johannesburg’s, with stronger revenue collection in the 2010s due to a large industrial customer base. The metro also pioneered some service delivery innovations, like a fleet of “borehole water tankers” to supply areas without piped water. However, the relentless pressures of cable theft, population growth, and national utility failures (electricity and water) have eroded those gains. By 2025, Ekurhuleni faces many of the same predicaments as its sister metros – public protests over failing services, businesses relocating or closing due to infrastructure unreliability, and the need for urgent intervention to avoid further decline. One local newspaper starkly headlined that parts of Ekurhuleni’s once-bustling industrial zones were at risk of becoming “ghost towns” if electricity and water stability cannot be restored.

Comparing South African Cities with Maputo and Luanda

To put the South African urban crises in perspective, it is useful to compare them with Maputo (the capital of Mozambique) and Luanda (the capital of Angola) – two major African cities that exhibit advanced urban dysfunction. Both Maputo and Luanda have histories of under-investment in infrastructure, rapid population growth, and governance challenges that in some ways mirror a possible future for South African metros if current trends are not reversed.

• Governance Models: A key difference lies in governance structures. South African cities operate in a democratic local government framework – they have elected councils and mayors, and while politics can be unstable, there is at least a mechanism for accountability through elections or provincial intervention. By contrast, Luanda has no elected city government; Angola has yet to hold municipal elections (city administration is appointed by the central government). This centralized model has often meant that local needs are subordinated to national politics, and residents have little recourse to demand better services. The result in Luanda was decades of neglect – during and after Angola’s civil war (1975–2002), the city government was ill-prepared and under-resourced to handle massive urban influx. Corruption at the national level also filtered down; despite Angola’s oil wealth, much of Luanda’s revenue was mismanaged by elites, with minimal investment in public infrastructure (especially in the vast informal musseque settlements). Maputo, on the other hand, does have an elected municipal council (since the late 1990s). It is dominated by a single party (Frelimo), which provides stability but also risks complacency. The new mayor of Maputo (elected in 2023) has publicly acknowledged rampant corruption and has “promised an end to corruption” and improved service delivery. However, implementing reforms is difficult in a context of limited financial resources and entrenched patronage networks. Unlike South African metros, Maputo cannot draw on a large tax base or substantial national grants – Mozambique is a poorer country and its capital’s budget is constrained. This means even well-intentioned leaders struggle to fund infrastructure upgrades. In summary, Luanda’s governance is highly centralized and historically unaccountable to residents, while Maputo has local democracy but is constrained by one-party dominance and resource scarcity. South African cities, with their local elections and louder civil society, have more opportunity for public pressure to effect change – yet thus far, that advantage has not prevented decline.
                                                
• Infrastructure Conditions: Luanda and Maputo both suffer from severe infrastructure deficits, often more extreme than those currently seen in Johannesburg or Durban. For example, water access in Luanda is extremely uneven: only a fraction of the population has piped water at home, and many residents rely on buying water from tanker trucks or private wells. In Luanda’s musseques (slums), communal standpipes are common and people pay high prices for potable water delivered in containers. A World Bank blog in 2011 noted a “vertical slum” building in Luanda where squatters on upper floors haul water by hand as a business, and everyone uses generators for power. Indeed, “fails of water and electricity supply” are a burden across Luanda – even middle-class neighborhoods often have their own generators due to unreliable grid power. During Angola’s war and the early 2000s, Luanda’s entire city of 2.5 million “lacked electricity” for extended periods, and blackouts were common as aging diesel turbines couldn’t meet demand. While the post-war government invested in new power plants (with Chinese loans, etc.), distribution remains problematic and many areas still get intermittent supply. Maputo has somewhat better electrification (Mozambique exports power from its dams, and Maputo being the capital is relatively well-connected), but still experiences outages and voltage fluctuations, especially in peri-urban districts. Water supply in Maputo is limited – only around half the households might have direct connections, with others relying on shared boreholes or tanker deliveries. Both cities struggle with aging infrastructure that has not kept up with growth: Maputo’s drainage and sewage systems, for instance, cover only central areas; large suburban expansions are unserved, leading to flooding and sanitation issues. Maputo faces regular floods in the rainy season due to clogged drainage and uncontrolled settlement in flood-prone areas. In Luanda, road infrastructure has been overwhelmed by rapid urban sprawl. The city’s population ballooned from under 500,000 (pre-1975) to over 8 million today. Existing roads couldn’t handle this; traffic in Luanda is notorious, with schoolchildren spending “five hours a day traveling to and from school” in congestion. The government has built some new highways and even a ring road, but intra-city public transport remains underdeveloped – most people rely on informal minibuses. Comparatively, Johannesburg and Pretoria still have far more extensive road networks and some mass transit (e.g. Gautrain, Rea Vaya BRT) – however, without intervention, they risk drifting toward the same congestion and informality seen in Luanda/Maputo as formal systems break down. Another point: housing and urban planning in Luanda and Maputo have lagged far behind needs. Luanda’s slums expanded with little oversight; even new Chinese-built housing projects on the periphery (like Kilamba) remain out of reach for most residents, so inequalities are stark. Maputo has large informal settlements (e.g. Chamanculo, Xiquelene) lacking basic services – much as parts of Soweto or informal settlements around Johannesburg lack infrastructure, but on a larger scale proportionally. The public health impacts are serious: Maputo’s high-density slums face constant threats of cholera and other diseases due to inadequate waste disposal and water supply. Luanda too has had recurrent cholera outbreaks and even pneumonic plague in past decades linked to poor sanitation in its slums.
                                                            
• Urban Planning and Resilience: There are lessons in how Maputo and Luanda’s cityscapes evolved. Maputo during colonial times was well-planned in the center (with wide boulevards and a grid), but after independence (1975) and the civil war, urban planning control loosened, leading to unregulated peri-urban development. Studies show that unplanned expansion around Maputo has resulted in costly retrofitting of infrastructure later on and exacerbates inequality. Planners in Maputo now face the challenge of extending services (roads, transit, utilities) to sprawling suburbs to prevent them from being isolated pockets of poverty. The city is attempting some “adaptive city framework” approaches – e.g. creating new transit corridors and densifying certain nodes – but progress is slow. Luanda, after the war, underwent a construction boom but in a top-down manner: new highways, office towers, and luxury apartments were built (often through public-private partnerships fueled by oil money), yet informal settlements were largely untouched or simply bulldozed in places, causing social conflict. The government’s approach has been to build new satellite towns (like Kilamba Kiaxi with tens of thousands of apartments) to rehouse slum dwellers. However, many of those new units ended up being occupied by middle-class civil servants because the poorest couldn’t afford them, and large musseques like Sambizanga remain. Resilience to shocks is low in both cities: Maputo is coastal and faces cyclones/flooding – its ability to respond is hampered by weak infrastructure (as seen when heavy rains regularly inundate parts of the city). Luanda faces chronic droughts for water (relying on the distant Kwanza River scheme) and had urban floods in 2018 that killed dozens in poor areas. In contrast, South African cities historically had more robust infrastructure and disaster response, but as those systems erode, they could face similarly high risks from extreme weather and uncontrolled urbanization.
                                            

In sum, Maputo and Luanda present a warning: when urban infrastructure fails to keep pace and governance does not prioritize maintenance and inclusive planning, cities can reach a point where dysfunction becomes deeply entrenched. Luanda’s example – a city where many have to bring their own water and power to their homes – shows an extreme that once seemed unthinkable for South African cities but now is a conceivable trajectory if decay continues. Maputo’s struggles with uneven development and public health highlight the importance of long-term urban planning and service equity, something South African metros must improve on. On the flip side, there are also success stories in these cities (e.g., Maputo has implemented a solid waste management overhaul with donor help, improving garbage collection in recent years; Luanda has greatly expanded paved roads and even introduced a city bus network post-2013). These suggest that turnaround is possible with concerted effort and investment. The following sections outline solutions and strategies that South African cities can adopt to avoid further decline and set themselves on a path to recovery – taking to heart the lessons from regional peers.

Solutions for Reversing Urban Decay: Architectural and Engineering Approaches

Turning around the decay in South Africa’s cities will require a combination of technical fixes, better urban planning, and governance reforms. Below we propose conceptual and implementable solutions across infrastructure, architecture, and management domains. These solutions are aimed at addressing the root problems – from restoring basic services in the short term to restructuring urban planning for sustainability in the long term. We also provide an implementation framework with realistic timelines.
                                          

1. Stabilize Governance and Fight Corruption
                                          

No engineering solution can succeed without sound governance. An immediate priority is to restore financial discipline and accountability in city administrations. Each metro should establish a special anti-corruption and project oversight unit, possibly with external experts, to ensure infrastructure budgets are spent properly and projects delivered on time. This could be done in partnership with institutions like the Auditor-General and civil society watchdogs (e.g. OUTA) for transparency. Fast-tracking the filling of critical vacancies with qualified professionals is essential – for example, hiring competent electrical engineers, water plant operators, and city planners rather than political appointees. Training and capacity-building programs can help address the “paucity of skilled human resources” identified in inquiries like Tshwane’s water report. Financial recovery plans – such as improving revenue collection (e.g. fixing billing systems, incentivizing payment) – will increase the funds available for services. Cities may also need to ring-fence maintenance budgets so they cannot be diverted. In practice, this means creating a culture of maintenance: schedule routine inspections for roads, pipes, and cables, and stick to those schedules. Leadership must set performance targets (e.g. X potholes filled or Y km of pipes replaced per quarter) and regularly report progress to the public. By cutting waste and corruption, cities can free up significant resources; for instance, reducing irregular spending by even 50% in Johannesburg could yield hundreds of millions of rand – enough to fix thousands of potholes or upgrade several substations. Anti-corruption efforts also include tackling the “construction mafia” and extortion that derail projects. KwaZulu-Natal’s government, for example, convened a task force in 2022 to crack down on such groups threatening construction sites. Cities should work closely with law enforcement to secure project sites so that legitimate contractors can work without fear. In summary, clean governance and robust management are the foundation on which technical solutions rest. This must start in the first 6–12 months of a turnaround, concurrent with emergency repairs.
                                                   

2. Emergency Repair and Maintenance Blitz
                                                  

With governance stabilized, the first technical step is an emergency infrastructure repair blitz to address the most dangerous and disruptive failures. This would involve deploying additional resources (possibly with provincial or national support) to:

• Fix Potholes and Roads: Launch “Operation Vala Zonke” style campaigns again to patch potholes on main arterials and residential streets. Modern cold-mix asphalt and spray-injection patching machines can accelerate this. Over a 3-6 month period, aim to clear the majority of potholes and rebuild critical road sections (especially around collapsed bridges or intersections). Also perform emergency repairs on priority bridges identified as near-failure – shoring them up or weight-limiting them to prevent catastrophes.
                     
• Secure Electricity Supply: Identify the top 10-20 high-impact electrical infrastructure points in each city (e.g. major substations like Njala in Tshwane, or aging power lines feeding large areas). Rapidly repair damaged transformers and reinforce pylons. Mobile generation units could be brought in to provide temporary power to areas hardest hit by substation failures. Additionally, implement immediate security measures: for example, install alarms, sensors or surveillance at substations and along key cable routes, and increase patrols. City Power in Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni Energy could partner with private security companies and community policing forums to guard infrastructure – evidence suggests that stricter enforcement can curb theft. The goal is to drastically cut incidents of theft/vandalism within months, as this will reduce repeated outages. Where feasible, start burying cables underground in the most theft-prone areas (an expensive but effective solution to copper theft). A triage approach should be used: fix what can be fixed quickly (like re-stringing downed lines), while planning medium-term upgrades.
                
• Restore Water Services: Similar to electricity, do a rapid assessment of water infrastructure: repair major leaks, replace broken pumps at water stations, and deploy water tankers to any area currently without water. For instance, cities might rent additional water tankers to ensure no community goes more than 24 hours without access to drinking water. Emergency procurement might be needed for pipe sections to replace those that burst often. Clearing clogged sewers and fixing critical wastewater plants (even if temporarily) is vital to prevent health crises. In Tshwane, for example, the emergency construction of a package water treatment plant in Hammanskraal was done in months once resources were allocated – similar urgency should be applied elsewhere. Every city should have an emergency standby contractor for water main breaks so that big leaks are fixed within 48 hours.
                                     
• Clean Up the Cities: An often overlooked aspect of urban decay is cleanliness. As a quick win, metros should address solid waste backlogs – deploy extra garbage trucks or contractor teams to remove trash piles, clear illegal dumps, and clean public spaces. A cleaner environment can improve public morale and reduce health risks while longer-term fixes are underway.
                                        

This emergency phase might span the first 6–12 months of an intervention. The aim is to stabilize services – get electricity on more reliably, water flowing, and roads passable. It’s essentially damage control to stop further decline. Table 1 below outlines a phased implementation framework, with the emergency stabilization as Phase 1:
                   

Table 1: Phased Implementation Framework for Urban Infrastructure Recovery. This framework outlines immediate stabilization actions, medium-term recovery projects, and long-term transformation strategies for South African cities, with example initiatives and timelines. The phases will overlap – e.g., some upgrades begin in year 1 – but the table illustrates priority focus in each period. Sources: maintenance backlog estimates, security measures, etc.
                        

3. Upgrading and Modernizing Infrastructure
                                            

Once the bleeding is stanched, cities must undertake a sustained program of infrastructure upgrading to address the root causes of breakdown. This includes:

• Electricity System Overhaul: The metros should draw up master plans to renew their electrical grids over, say, a 5–10 year period. This means replacing old cables (prioritizing those over, e.g., 40 years old), installing modern switchgear that can handle load-shedding surges, and adding redundancy. Johannesburg’s identified R170 billion need will require staged investment – perhaps R17 billion per year over 10 years. Public-private partnerships can help here: for instance, concessioning certain distribution zones to private firms to modernize (with regulation to protect consumers). At the same time, promote embedded generation – making it easier and faster for businesses and homeowners to install rooftop solar and feed excess into the grid. This reduces demand on aging infrastructure and provides some decentralized resilience. Cape Town has already begun paying businesses for power injection; other cities could emulate this. Additionally, implement energy-efficient retrofits like LED streetlights (which use less power and are harder to steal for scrap than copper-heavy older lights). Over time, as theft is curbed, reintroduce metal theft units (in police and scrap yard regulation) to sustain the reduction. By 2030, the goal should be that local outages (aside from Eskom’s national load-shedding) are rare, and the city grid can meet demand reliably.
                                                              
• Water and Sanitation Upgrades: Each city’s water utility needs a comprehensive pipe replacement plan. For example, Johannesburg aiming to replace a significant percentage of the 60% of pipes beyond design life within 5–7 years. Modern materials (e.g., HDPE pipes) that are less prone to leakage can be used. Leak detection technology (acoustic sensors, smart pressure management) should be employed to pinpoint hidden leaks – Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni lose roughly a third of their water to non-revenue losses, so even halving that would massively improve supply. Upgrading and expanding wastewater treatment capacity is crucial to avoid pollution and health hazards. Cities might need to build new wastewater plants or modular package plants to handle current loads and future growth. This is also an opportunity to incorporate water reuse – treated wastewater can be further purified for industrial use or even potable reuse, as some forward-looking cities globally do. Considering climate change and recurring droughts, metros should invest in alternative water sources: harvesting stormwater, protecting groundwater wellfields, and in coastal eThekwini, possibly desalination on a small scale for resilience. Rainwater harvesting at public buildings (schools, offices) could supplement non-potable demand and ease pressure on the grid. By improving maintenance, cities can also reduce the risk of incidents like Hammanskraal – ensuring every wastewater plant has backup power, a maintenance schedule, and emergency response plans if water quality falls. Community education forms part of the solution: public campaigns on water conservation (like those that helped Cape Town halve its water use during the Day Zero crisis) and on reporting leaks or illegal connections can foster shared responsibility.
                                                                     
• Roads and Transportation: After emergency pothole fixes, a longer-term roads rehabilitation program is needed. Cities should resurface or reconstruct badly worn roads rather than repeatedly patching. Introducing preventative maintenance (like sealing cracks annually to prevent potholes) is cost-effective. Bridge rehabilitation must be prioritized: Johannesburg’s statistic of 90% bridges in poor condition is alarming; a funded program to repair or rebuild bridges over, say, 10 years should be launched, starting with those 20 identified at risk of collapse. Funding could come from a mix of municipal bonds and national grants (bridges, being critical infrastructure, might attract conditional grants). On the traffic front, fixing/replacing broken traffic lights and possibly moving toward solar-powered or grid-independent signals with theft-resistant technology (as Johannesburg has started in some corridors) will improve traffic flow and reduce accidents. Public transport is a major part of infrastructure recovery: reliable public transit reduces road wear (fewer cars) and provides affordable mobility. Cities must get their BRT systems back on track – that involves resolving the disputes with minibus taxi operators through negotiation and compensation where needed, and enforcing law against those who violently disrupt. Ethekwini’s Go!Durban can be salvaged by contracting willing taxi associations to operate BRT buses (a model used in Cape Town’s MyCiTi after initial conflicts). Likewise, Johannesburg’s Rea Vaya needs expansion to reach more commuters, and Tshwane’s A Re Yeng routes must be completed. If BRT proves too contentious in some corridors, invest in conventional bus fleets and dedicated lanes as interim steps. Additionally, improve commuter rail where possible (though Prasa is nationally run, cities can advocate for it). The objective is by 2030 to have a more balanced transport network, not solely dependent on private cars or informal minibuses. This also ties into urban planning – densifying along transit corridors to make systems viable.
                                                       
• Harness Technology and Smart City Solutions: Embracing modern technology will enhance the effectiveness of upgrades. Smart city control centers can integrate data from electricity, water, and traffic systems to allow proactive management. For instance, if a water pressure drop is detected in a sector, crews can be dispatched before a pipe fully bursts. If sensors show a substation overheating, load can be rerouted. Installing SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems more widely in municipal utilities will provide real-time visibility. Drones can be used to inspect power lines and detect illegal connections or metal theft early. GIS (Geographic Information Systems) mapping of all infrastructure, combined with an asset management database, will help track the condition of assets and schedule timely renewals – moving from reactive to preventive maintenance. Some South African cities have started on this (e.g., eThekwini was known for a decent GIS system for water); these efforts need reinforcement and updating. Digital platforms for citizens to report issues (like potholes or outages via mobile apps) can also greatly improve responsiveness and rebuild trust – for example, the City of Cape Town’s fault reporting app has generally been well-received and speeds up repair workflows. Over time, the data gathered from these systems can guide where investments are most needed (e.g., identifying neighborhoods with frequent outages or leaks to target for upgrades).
                                                           

4. Urban Planning, Design, and Housing Interventions
                                                                     

Infrastructure fixes must be complemented by better urban planning and design – essentially the architectural dimension of city recovery. This ensures that solutions are not just technical but also reshape the urban environment in positive ways:

• Reinventing the Inner City: All four metros have inner-city areas suffering from decay (Johannesburg CBD, Durban CBD and beachfront, Pretoria CBD, Germiston CBD, etc.). A concerted urban regeneration program is needed. This would involve identifying “bad buildings” – those that are structurally unsound, illegally occupied, or abandoned – and taking decisive action. Cities should use enforcement tools to evacuate and secure unsafe buildings (with humane relocation for occupants), then either renovate them for public housing or sell them to private developers under conditions of redevelopment. Johannesburg’s council, for instance, has started a “Better Buildings Programme” in the past – this needs revival at scale. Providing incentives (tax breaks, expedited approvals) for developers to repurpose old offices into affordable apartments can help address housing shortages while eliminating urban blight. Increasing residential presence in CBDs will also improve safety and economic activity – more “eyes on the street” and demand for shops and services. Cape Town’s central city managed this successfully over the last two decades, maintaining a vibrant downtown; other cities can follow suit. Public realm improvements are key: create well-designed, safe public spaces – parks, pedestrianized streets – that encourage people to return downtown. Durban’s “Dignified Places” programme in early 2000s (where they upgraded public spaces in townships and the city) is an example of urban design improving livability. Small interventions like better street lighting, public art, and market spaces for informal traders can revive a sense of community. The design must be inclusive: consult current street vendors, residents, etc., to ensure upgrades serve them and do not lead to unwanted displacement.
                                                       
• Addressing Informal Settlements: The growth of informal settlements is both a consequence and a cause of urban dysfunction. Without proper housing, people settle wherever they can (often on unsafe land), which then creates new infrastructure burdens (as seen in Maputo and Luanda, but also in places like Durban’s floodplains). Cities need to scale up housing delivery for low-income residents – not just RDP houses on distant peripheries, but well-located, higher-density social housing. Converting vacant city-owned land and buildings into affordable units is one approach. Another is supporting in-situ upgrading of informal settlements: providing basic services (water standpipes, sanitation, electricity) and securing tenure for residents, then incrementally improving structures. This approach, supported by urban planners, can drastically improve living conditions quickly without waiting for full housing developments. It also reduces illegal utility connections and unhealthy conditions. Programs like re-blocking (reorganizing shacks to create access ways for emergency services and infrastructure, as done in some Cape Town and Johannesburg settlements) should be expanded. Engaging communities in the design – potentially training “community architects” as was done in a Johannesburg pilot – ensures solutions fit local needs. Adequate housing provision has a ripple effect: it stabilizes families, improves public health, and reduces the stress on inner cities (as fewer people resort to hijacking buildings if better alternatives exist). Over a decade, the aim would be to eliminate the need for hazardous informal housing by providing sufficient formal affordable options.
                                                               
• Spatial Planning for Sustainability: In the long term, cities should aim to undo the inefficient apartheid-era spatial arrangements (which still largely persist, with poor communities on city edges). This involves encouraging mixed-use development and densification in nodes that can be well-served by infrastructure. The new Cape Town policy embracing New Urbanism – promoting multi-use neighborhoods, walkability, and preservation of heritage and green spaces – is a good template. For example, repurpose underutilized industrial land in Johannesburg (like old mining belt areas) into mixed-income residential and commercial districts, easing pressure on congested areas and utilizing existing infrastructure. Ensure new developments contribute to infrastructure costs (through development contributions) so they don’t overload city systems without expansion. Planning must also integrate climate resilience: Durban and Ekurhuleni need to enforce buffer zones along rivers to prevent building in flood-prone areas; Johannesburg and Pretoria need strategies for more green cover to mitigate heat and manage stormwater (urban flooding is a rising threat due to more intense storms and much of the city being paved). Green infrastructure – like creating wetlands or retention ponds, planting street trees, and maintaining floodplains as parks – can help manage these risks while beautifying the city. Additionally, incorporate reliable public transit access into land use planning (e.g., higher densities along Gautrain or BRT routes) so that future growth is transit-oriented rather than car-dependent.
                                                              
• Community Involvement and Ownership: A softer but crucial aspect of urban renewal is rebuilding trust and civic pride. The cities should involve communities in maintenance through initiatives like “adopt-a-spot” for parks or having local business forums sponsor the fixing of a specific street. Where residents have taken it upon themselves to do repairs (like volunteer pothole fillers or street clean-up crews), the city can support them with materials or small grants. This not only extends the city’s reach but also fosters a sense of ownership that can deter vandalism. Public communication should be improved – e.g., a dashboard of service restoration efforts so citizens see progress (Johannesburg’s mayor recently started publishing updates on pothole numbers filled, which is a good practice). When people feel heard and see improvements, they are more likely to pay for services and cooperate (for instance, reporting cable thieves or refraining from illegal connections).
                                                 

By combining these planning and design measures with the hard infrastructure upgrades, cities can move towards a more livable and functional form. Importantly, these changes set the stage for resilience: a well-planned city with maintained infrastructure can withstand shocks (like extreme weather or economic fluctuations) far better. In the next section, we delve into one specific institutional reform that underpins successful urban planning – the role of the City Architect.

The Crucial Role of the City Architect in Long-Term Urban Recovery

One powerful lever for sustainable urban regeneration is reinstating the role of the City Architect (or analogous chief urban designer) in municipal governments. Historically, many cities around the world – and indeed in South Africa – had a City Architect’s Department that led the design of public buildings, guided urban aesthetics, and ensured coherent planning. Over the past few decades, however, most South African metros abolished the City Architect position as they restructured administrations (often merging it under engineering or planning departments). Cape Town stands out as a city that maintained a strong urban design unit with a de facto City Architect function, and this has had positive impacts on its urban environment. Let’s examine what a City Architect does and why reviving this role could significantly aid Johannesburg, Durban, Tshwane, and Ekurhuleni in their recovery and resilience efforts.
                   

What is the City Architect? – The City Architect is a senior official (usually a professionally accredited architect or urban designer) charged with overseeing the design of municipal projects and the broader urban form. This role involves setting design guidelines for public spaces, reviewing major development plans for architectural quality, and acting as a custodian of a city’s spatial vision. In essence, the City Architect brings an architectural lens to citybuilding, complementing the engineers and town planners. This means considerations of functionality, beauty, cultural heritage, and human-scale design are injected into urban projects. For example, a City Architect might influence how a new library is sited and designed to serve as a community hub, or ensure that a bridge replacement also adds pedestrian amenities and visual appeal. They work on integration – making sure that as infrastructure is rebuilt, it aligns with long-term city plansThey work on integration – making sure that as infrastructure is rebuilt, it aligns with long-term plans and sound urban design principles, rather than ad hoc fixes. A City Architect thus champions quality and coherence in the built environment. This role was historically present in cities like Durban (eThekwini) – for example, Jonathan Edkins served as City Architect there for over two decades, leading the architecture unit until 2015. Under such guidance, Durban implemented noteworthy projects (e.g. Warwick Junction upgrades, beachfront redevelopment) with a holistic design eye. Cape Town has maintained a strong City Architect/urban design function, which is evident in its better-preserved historic precincts and proactive spatial policies. In 2014, Cape Town was named World Design Capital, partly reflecting the city’s commitment to design-led urban development; its Dignified Places Programme created high-quality public spaces in disadvantaged areas, guided by city architects and urban designers. By contrast, Johannesburg, Tshwane, and others largely phased out their City Architect offices during restructuring – often viewing them as non-essential. This left a gap in vision: engineers and town planners (critical as they are) often face pressure to prioritize quantity and cost over design quality or sustainability. The absence of a chief architect means no single authority is arguing for the aesthetics, heritage preservation, or human-centered design aspects of urban projects. The result can be seen in uninspiring, fortress-like public buildings, ill-planned developments, and the neglect of civic architecture that fosters community pride.
                                                              

Why reinstating the City Architect matters: First, it provides continuity and long-term thinking. Politicians come and go, but a professional City Architect (ideally a civil servant position) can consistently push a 20-year vision for the city’s form – ensuring that, say, a road rebuild today considers where future pedestrian zones or transit lines will go. Second, City Architects tend to encourage innovation in the built environment. As noted in a South African architects’ forum, cities that employ architects have pioneered urban innovations: for example, the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) concept was spearheaded by architect-turned-mayor Jaime Lerner in Curitiba, Brazil, and has since been emulated worldwide. Another example: In Bern, Switzerland, having a city architect on staff helped transform public building practices over years – integrating energy-efficient design and better construction methods. In the South African context, a City Architect could ensure that when we rebuild infrastructure, we also build back better: a collapsed bridge rebuilt not just to original spec, but redesigned to be a safer, more community-friendly space (perhaps adding sidewalks or public art). Or when new housing is developed, that it’s not just a monotonous row of RDP houses, but a well-designed neighborhood with proper public spaces.
                                                             

Third, City Architects serve as “ambassadors” for architecture and urban design within the government, educating other departments on the value of good design. They can help coordinate between siloed departments – for instance, aligning a water pipeline project with plans for a new park so that the trenching could create a landscaped canal rather than just buried pipes. This interdisciplinary coordination is crucial for resilience: a City Architect, looking at the big picture, would advocate nature-based solutions (like preserving wetlands for flood control) and culturally appropriate design (maintaining the identity of a city even as it modernizes). Cape Town’s Deputy Mayor recently emphasized design’s impact on how a place “feels” and functions – having a City Architect ensures someone in city hall is constantly working to make the city feel welcoming and well-organized.
                                                     

Finally, the City Architect role can help cities engage with external experts and communities. They often liaise with local architects’ institutes, universities, and developers to craft better policies. For instance, Johannesburg could form a design review panel chaired by the City Architect to peer-review major developments – this can raise the bar on private projects too, ensuring new buildings contribute positively to the streetscape (much like many European cities do). They also give citizens a point of contact for urban design concerns – e.g. heritage societies can work with the City Architect to save historic structures while finding new uses for them, rather than seeing them fall into ruin.
                                            

In practical terms, reinstating a City Architect department would mean hiring or appointing a qualified chief architect and a small team within the municipality. Their mandate: develop urban design frameworks, advise on all significant capital projects, and lead special projects for urban renewal. The cost of this is marginal in a big city budget, but the returns – more thoughtful, liveable urban spaces – are significant. As the South African Institute of Architects has pointed out, cities that acknowledge architecture’s importance in development tend to foster more innovative and inclusive environments. After years of chaos, reintroducing this function in cities like Durban or Johannesburg can help institutionalize the forward-looking mindset needed for sustained recovery. It would ensure that once the current backlog of repairs is dealt with, the cities do not slip back into neglect, but move ahead with a clear vision of urban excellence and resilience.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Reversing the urban decay in Johannesburg, Durban, Tshwane, and Ekurhuleni is an immense challenge – but as this report has shown, it is achievable with a combination of determined governance reforms, intelligent planning, and robust engineering solutions. The comparison with Maputo and Luanda underscores that if we fail to act, our cities could face even worse dysfunction; conversely, learning from what has worked elsewhere offers hope. Below is a summary of key actionable recommendations for turning around South Africa’s ailing cities:

• Launch Emergency Service Delivery Interventions: Immediately implement a focused maintenance blitz to address critical issues – fix potholes and traffic lights, repair broken water pumps and substations, and clear waste backlogs. This rapid response (within 3-6 months) will stabilize conditions and signal to residents that recovery has begun.
                                     
• Tackle Theft, Vandalism, and Crime on Infrastructure: Form dedicated units (with law enforcement support) to protect infrastructure from cable theft, illegal connections, and sabotage. Increasing security around electrical and water installations and enforcing scrap metal laws will reduce outages and damage. Likewise, clamp down on construction site extortion by criminal groups so that projects can proceed uninterrupted.
                                  
• Invest Heavily in Infrastructure Renewal (with Private Partnerships): Substantially increase capital investment in municipal infrastructure – ideally on the order of an extra R100 billion per year nationally to move the needle from the current “D” grade up to acceptable levels. This funding can be raised via a mix of government bonds, budget reallocations (cutting waste), and private sector partnerships. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) should be pursued for power generation (letting businesses feed the grid) and even distribution upgrades, given constrained public finances.
                                               
• Improve Governance and Accountability: Restore good governance by appointing qualified technical managers in key roles and rooting out corruption. Cities must enforce consequence management – officials implicated in graft or mismanagement of service delivery funds should be removed and prosecuted. Strengthen financial controls to ensure maintenance budgets are actually spent on maintenance (not diverted). Engage communities through ward councils so that there is grassroots monitoring of service delivery. A culture of accountability will rebuild public trust and ensure funds go where they are needed most.
                                                      
• Implement a Medium-Term Infrastructure Upgrade Program: Develop and execute a 5–10 year plan for phased replacement of aging infrastructure. For electricity: upgrade substations and transmission lines, install modern control systems, and create redundancy to minimize outage impact. For water: replace old pipes systematically and expand treatment capacity, while reducing water losses by half through leak repairs and smarter pressure management. Prioritize projects that yield reliability improvements for the greatest number of people (e.g. fixing a key reservoir that feeds multiple suburbs). Set clear targets (e.g. less than 15% non-revenue water by 2030, or less than 1 outage per year on main feeder lines) and track progress.
                                                
• Revive Public Transport and Road Maintenance: Commit to getting municipal bus and BRT systems back on track within 1–2 years. This includes resolving disputes with minibus taxi operators (through negotiation or enforcement) so that BRT routes can be completed. Meanwhile, allocate dedicated funding for road resurfacing – don’t just fill potholes, but resurface roads before they fail. Proper road maintenance schedules should be adhered to in all cities to prevent the pothole epidemic from recurring. Expand efforts like Johannesburg’s partnership with SANRAL on major roads, and explore toll or levy options for heavy trucks that damage city roads to fund repairs.
                                                              
• Engage Citizens in Reporting and Co-management: Leverage technology and community goodwill by rolling out user-friendly platforms for citizens to report service issues (potholes, leaks, outages) and track response times. Encourage community organizations to “adopt” local amenities (parks, open spaces) – the city can support them with tools and waste removal. Public participation in budgeting (to decide local infrastructure priorities) can also ensure that interventions match what communities need most. An engaged citizenry will act as the eyes and ears to alert officials to problems early, reducing the chance of small issues becoming big crises.
                                                                   
• Reintroduce the City Architect and Strengthen Urban Planning: Reinstate a City Architect’s office in each major metro to guide urban design and planning decisions towards sustainability and inclusivity. Cape Town’s experience shows the value of design-oriented leadership – for instance, its new Policy on Designing Quality Places (2024) is improving neighborhoods by emphasizing walkability and mixed-use development. Other cities should develop similar frameworks under the stewardship of a chief architect/urban designer. This will ensure infrastructure investments contribute to a coherent, livable urban form and not just piecemeal fixes. The City Architect can also spearhead regeneration of inner cities by coordinating public-private initiatives to fix “bad buildings” and create vibrant public spaces, as well as incorporate climate resilience measures (like green infrastructure) into all projects.
                                          
• Monitor, Adapt, and Sustain the Effort: Finally, institute a robust monitoring mechanism for the recovery plan. This could be a quarterly “State of the City Infrastructure” report published by each metro, detailing key metrics (number of outages, pipe bursts, response times, budget spent on maintenance, etc.) and progress on projects. If something isn’t working – say, cable theft isn’t dropping – adapt strategies (perhaps invest in new anti-theft technology or adjust policing). Celebrate and communicate wins (like reduction in water losses or successful completion of a housing project) to maintain momentum and public support. Plan for the long haul: even after visible improvements in 5 years, maintain funding and maintenance regimes so that the cities don’t fall back into neglect.
                            

By implementing these recommendations, South African cities can break the cycle of urban decay and set themselves on a path to recovery. The process will demand political will, professional expertise, and community collaboration. The experiences of Maputo and Luanda show the costs of inaction, but also hint at solutions – such as the need for effective urban management and the dangers of unchecked sprawl – that our cities can heed. Most importantly, success in Johannesburg, Durban, Tshwane, and Ekurhuleni will come from a recognition that infrastructure is the backbone of a city: it must be cared for diligently, upgraded smartly, and planned with a vision of a thriving, inclusive urban future. With steady effort and the strategies outlined above, South Africa’s great cities can avoid collapse and instead become models of urban resilience and good governance in the region.

Sources:

• Auditor-General South Africa – Report on Municipal Audit Outcomes 2023 (cited in BusinessTech)
• Businesstech (2025), “South Africa’s most important city collapsing in front of everyone’s eyes”
• News24 (2023), “Joburg water crisis: Grid near collapse as authorities lack funds”
• SA Human Rights Commission (2023), Report on KZN Water Supply Risks; Media Statement on Hammanskraal Cholera (2025)
• Daily Maverick (2023), “Financially distressed Tshwane battles strike, water shortages”
• Sowetan Live (2023), “Ekurhuleni businesses buckle under cable theft”
• Al Jazeera (2022), “Four dead in South Africa protests over high power costs”
• The Cape Independent (2024), “Cape Town embraces New Urbanism in updated planning guidelines”
• SACAP (2023), Interview with SA Institute of Architects President
• AllAfrica (2023), “Durban’s hijacked buildings in spotlight after Joburg inferno”
• World Bank Blogs (2011), “Luanda’s vertical slums”, and various urban planning academic sources.